[Interpretationandmethods] Mark Bevir’s Methodological Gaps
psshea at csbs.utah.edu
psshea at csbs.utah.edu
Thu Jul 17 10:51:19 EDT 2008
Thanks Laleh for that citation. I would also add Wallerstein's The
End of the World as We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First
Century,1999,U of Minn Press. Peri
Quoting Laleh Khalili <lk180 at columbia.edu>:
>
>
> I can't speak to the second question, but as for disciplinary
> boundaries, Tim Mitchell has written a fascinating chapter for a book
> in which he argues (very briefly, as the main thrust of the article is
> something related but different) that the hardening of disciplinary
> boundaries is very recent and really a function of the politics (of
> both the "real world" sort and of academia). I find the argument
> plausible.
>
> Beside, having been trained as a "political scientist" in the US and
> teaching in a "politics" department in the UK which is anything but
> scientistic, and using all the methods and methodologies of *other*
> disciplines makes me not so concerned or worried about the possibility
> that these boundaries may be dissolved... Quite the contrary! :)
>
> The Mitchell chapter can be read at
>
> http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=uciaspubs/editedvolumes
>
> Laleh
> SOAS
>
>
>
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2008, wjkellpro at aol.com wrote:
>
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>> Hello Fellow Interpretationistas!
>>
>> Lately I have been reading essays written, in whole or in part, by
>> Mark Bevir. I am very impressed by his understanding, and
>> practice, of interpretive social science. However, I do have a
>> couple of concerns.
>>
>> One is that his approach seems to dissolve all the traditional
>> "boundaries" in the social sciences. How can he, or any
>> interpretive social scientist, distinguish between sociology,
>> political science, or history? What is the methodological
>> rationale, if any, for marking off these boundaries? Is it only a
>> matter of self-identity? E.g., "I am employed in the Sociology
>> Department, therefore whatever I do is 'sociology'"?
>>
>> Can anyone point out some literature where this problem has been
>> resolved? I don't think Bevir has even addressed this issue.
>>
>> Secondly, Bevir's idea of being "critical" also leaves me
>> unsatisfied. He seems to think that being critical is limited to
>> such things as: a) exposing the actual relativity of claims to know
>> what is true or right with universal intent; b) revealing the
>> internal contradictions in an ideology, or claim to know; c)
>> finding distortions of fact; or, d)unmasking deceptions.
>>
>> These are all "critical" tactics from the neopositivist
>> "logical-empirical" point of view, but this very point of view
>> seems to me to be a self-contradiction within the interpretation
>> framework. In my understanding, there cannot be a "neopositivist"
>> value-neutral interpretive social science. Its
>> an oxymoron!
>>
>> Bevir says that he is committed to the view that people generally
>> act for reasons, and that it is his job to interpret those reasons
>> from the human behavior. But his theory of human rationality seems
>> to me overly technocratic; that is, lacking in any feeling for the
>> respect that is implicit in the major part of human behavior. He
>> sees people as creatively responding to dilemmas as their
>> traditional ways of acting and thinking are challenged. But he
>> seems unable to account for the way people generally shape those
>> responses with some element of concern for their impact on others.
>> He appears to distinguish between capitalist ideologies and
>> socialist ideologies, only by their logical properties. He doesn’t
>> explain why or how humans are valued differently within either
>> belief system. In the technocratic view, humans have no more value
>> than any of the other things in the world.
>>
>> For reasons stated in my prior posts, I would like to ask Bevir how
>> a human could be "rational" without being respectful of others?
>>
>> Consistent with this technocratic theory of rationality, Bevir's
>> method fails to acknowledge any part played by feelings of respect
>> for those whose meanings he sets out to interpret. And this seems
>> to me to be a methodological self-contradiction.
>>
>> To interpret the meanings of another, one person must engage the
>> other with a substantial degree of mutuality. This is a
>> requirement of empathy. The other is regarded as a person in
>> fundamen
>> tal ways like oneself; that is, sentient, full of meanings, and
>> acting for reasons. As Polanyi points out, this relationship is a
>> form of companionship. Even if the other is one of those dead
>> white guys they study in history, to understand him requires a
>> relationship of human mutuality.
>>
>> So, how can anyone have such a relationship without feeling some
>> respect for the other? That does not mean one must approve of the
>> other’s behavior, but to know someone person-to-person is to have a
>> respectful relationship. There is no such thing as an objective
>> interpretation, and Bevir has recognized that. So, to interpret
>> requires that one person engage the other as a fellow person.
>> Polanyi calls it an I-Thou relationship.
>>
>> Therefore, the professional conduct of interpretive social science
>> requires having respect for the human subject. But Bevir's
>> approach seems overly intellectualized and perhaps alienated from
>> the other.
>>
>> I am sure he actually does respect people, but he factors this out
>> of his social science. But is that intellectually honest, or fully
>> truthful? If you respect people as you are interpreting their
>> meanings, isn't that a part of your methodology?
>>
>> I think it is, and we Interpretationistas ought to say it.
>>
>> Bill Kelleher
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> !DSPAM:487ef9e719257163845084!
--
Peregrine Schwartz-Shea
Professor
University of Utah
Political Science Department
260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9152
(801) 581-6300 phone mail
psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu
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