[Interpretationandmethods] Mark Bevir’s Methodological Gaps

[Laleh Khalili]

I can't speak to the second question, but as for disciplinary boundaries, 
Tim Mitchell has written a fascinating chapter for a book in which he 
argues (very briefly, as the main thrust of the article is something 
related but different) that the hardening of disciplinary boundaries is 
very recent and really a function of the politics (of both the "real 
world" sort and of academia). I find the argument plausible.

Beside, having been trained as a "political scientist" in the US and 
teaching in a "politics" department in the UK which is anything but 
scientistic, and using all the methods and methodologies of *other* 
disciplines makes me not so concerned or worried about the possibility 
that these boundaries may be dissolved...  Quite the contrary!  :)

The Mitchell chapter can be read at

http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=uciaspubs/editedvolumes

Laleh
SOAS



On Wed, 16 Jul 2008, wjkellpro at aol.com wrote:

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> Hello Fellow Interpretationistas!
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> Lately I have been reading essays written, in whole or in part, by Mark Bevir.  I am very impressed by his understanding, and practice, of interpretive social science.  However, I do have a couple of concerns. 
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> One is that his approach seems to dissolve all the traditional "boundaries" in the social sciences.  How can he, or any interpretive social scientist, distinguish between sociology, political science, or history?  What is the methodological rationale, if any, for marking off these boundaries?  Is it only a matter of self-identity?  E.g., "I am employed in the Sociology Department, therefore whatever I do is 'sociology'"?
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> Can anyone point out some literature where this problem has been resolved?  I don't think Bevir has even addressed this issue.
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> Secondly, Bevir's idea of being "critical" also leaves me unsatisfied.  He seems to think that being critical is limited to such things as: a) exposing the actual relativity of claims to know what is true or right with universal intent;  b) revealing the internal contradictions in an ideology, or claim to know;  c) finding distortions of fact; or, d)unmasking deceptions.
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> These are all "critical" tactics from the neopositivist "logical-empirical" point of view, but this very point of view seems to me to be a self-contradiction within the interpretation framework.  In my understanding, there cannot be a "neopositivist" value-neutral interpretive social science.  Its
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> Bevir says that he is committed to the view that people generally act for reasons, and that it is his job to interpret those reasons from the human behavior.  But his theory of human rationality seems to me overly technocratic; that is, lacking in any feeling for the respect that is implicit in the major part of human behavior.  He sees people as creatively responding to dilemmas as their traditional ways of acting and thinking are challenged.  But he seems unable to account for the way people generally shape those responses with some element of concern for their impact on others.  He appears to distinguish between capitalist ideologies and socialist ideologies, only by their logical properties.  He doesn’t explain why or how humans are valued differently within either belief system.  In the technocratic view, humans have no more value than any of the other things in the world. 
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> For reasons stated in my prior posts, I would like to ask Bevir how a human could be "rational" without being respectful of others?
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> Consistent with this technocratic theory of rationality, Bevir's method fails to acknowledge any part played by feelings of respect for those whose meanings he sets out to interpret.  And this seems to me to be a methodological self-contradiction. 
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> To interpret the meanings of another, one person must engage the other with a substantial degree of mutuality.  This is a requirement of empathy.  The other is regarded as a person in fundamen
> tal ways like oneself; that is, sentient, full of meanings, and acting for reasons.  As Polanyi points out, this relationship is a form of companionship.  Even if the other is one of those dead white guys they study in history, to understand him requires a relationship of human mutuality. 
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> So, how can anyone have such a relationship without feeling some respect for the other?  That does not mean one must approve of the other’s behavior, but to know someone person-to-person is to have a respectful relationship.  There is no such thing as an objective interpretation, and Bevir has recognized that.  So, to interpret requires that one person engage the other as a fellow person.  Polanyi calls it an I-Thou relationship.
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> Therefore, the professional conduct of interpretive social science requires having respect for the human subject.  But Bevir's approach seems overly intellectualized and perhaps alienated from the other.
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> I am sure he actually does respect people, but he factors this out of his social science.  But is that intellectually honest, or fully truthful?  If you respect people as you are interpreting their meanings, isn't that a part of your methodology?
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> I think it is, and we Interpretationistas ought to say it.
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> Bill Kelleher
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