[Interpretationandmethods] Mark Bevir’s Methodological Gaps

Wed Jul 16 21:03:32 EDT 2008

Bill, 

I don't have the time to respond to your many questions posed here -- 
but as I've been perusing your posts over the past week or so, I think 
you might find a lot of interest in a book I'm using for my philosophy 
of social science course in the fall:

Fay, Brian. /Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: A Multicultural 
Approach/. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

He has a nice discusison of rationality and, checking the index just 
now, an entry for respect.

Peri S-S

wjkellpro at aol.com wrote:

>  
>  
>  
> Hello Fellow Interpretationistas!
>
> Lately I have been reading essays written, in whole or in part, by 
> Mark Bevir.  I am very impressed by his understanding, and practice, 
> of interpretive social science.  However, I do have a couple of 
> concerns. 
>
> One is that his approach seems to dissolve all the traditional 
> "boundaries" in the social sciences.  How can he, or any interpretive 
> social scientist, distinguish between sociology, political science, or 
> history?  What is the methodological rationale, if any, for marking 
> off these boundari es?  Is it only a matter of self-identity?  E.g., 
> "I am employed in the Sociology Department, therefore whatever I do is 
> 'sociology'"?
>
> Can anyone point out some literature where this problem has been 
> resolved?  I don't think Bevir has even addressed this issue.
>
> Secondly, Bevir's idea of being "critical" also leaves me 
> unsatisfied.  He seems to think that being critical is limited to such 
> things as: a) exposing the actual relativity of claims to know what is 
> true or right with universal intent;  b) revealing the internal 
> contradictions in an ideology, or claim to know;  c) finding 
> distortions of fact; or, d)unmasking deceptions.
>
> These are all "critical" tactics from the neopositivist 
> "logical-empirical" point of view, but this very point of view seems 
> to me to be a self-contradiction within the interpretation framework.  
> In my understanding, there cannot be a "neopositivist" 
> value-neutral interpretive social science.  Its an oxymoron!
>
> Bevir says that he is committed to the view that people generally act 
> for reasons, and that it is his job to interpret those reasons from 
> the human behavior.  But his theory of human rationality seems to me 
> overly technocratic; that is, lacking in any feeling for the respect 
> that is implicit in the major part of human behavior.  He sees people 
> as creatively responding to dilemmas as their traditional ways of 
> acting and thinking are challenged.  But he seems unable to account 
> for the way people generally shape those responses with some element 
> of concern for their impact on others.  He appears to distinguish 
> between capitalist ideologies and socialist ideologies, only by their 
> logical properties.  He doesn’t explain why or how humans are valued 
> differently within either belief system.  In the technocratic view, 
> humans have no more value than any of the other /things/ in the world. 
>
> For reasons stated in my prior posts, I would like to ask Bevir how 
> a=2 0human could be "rational" without being respectful of others?
>
> Consistent with this technocratic theory of rationality, Bevir's 
> method fails to acknowledge any part played by feelings of respect for 
> those whose meanings he sets out to interpret.  And this seems to me 
> to be a methodological self-contradiction. 
>
> To interpret the meanings of another, one person must engage the other 
> with a substantial degree of mutuality.  This is a requirement of 
> empathy.  The other is regarded as a person in fundamental ways like 
> oneself; that is, sentient, full of meanings, and acting for reasons.  
> As Polanyi points out, this relationship is a form of companionship.  
> Even if the other is one of those dead white guys they study in 
> history, to understand him requires a relationship of human mutuality. 
>
> So, how can anyone have such a relationship without feeling some 
> respect for the other?  That does not mean one must approve of the 
> other’s behavior, but to know someone person-to-person is to have a 
> respectful relationship.  There is no such thing as an objective 
> interpretation, and Bevir has recognized that.  So, to interpret 
> requires that one person engage the other as a fellow person.  Polanyi 
> calls it an I-Thou relationship.
>
> Therefore, the professional conduct of interpretive social science 
> requires having respect for the human subject.  But Bevir's approach 
> seems overly intellectualized and perhaps alienated from the other.
>
> I am sure he actually does respect people, but he factors this out of 
> his social science.  But is that intellectually honest, or fully 
> truthful?  If you respect people as you are interpreting their 
> meanings, isn't that a part of your methodology?
>
> I think it is, and we Interpretationistas ought to say it.
>
> Bill Kelleher
>   
>  
>  
> 0A
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-- 
Peregrine Schwartz-Shea
Professor

University of Utah
Political Science Department
260 South Central Campus Drive Rm 252
Salt Lake City, UT  84112-9152

(801) 581-6300 phone mail
psshea at poli-sci.utah.edu

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