[Interpretationandmethods] THE SCIENCE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE.

[wjkellpro at aol.com]

THE SCIENCE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE.

On 7-7-08 I offered some examples of how one could go about organizing an interpretive social science study.  Examples included a study of Bush's order to invade Iraq, IT governance, and, later, slavery among the Ancient Greeks.  While Patrick has given some trenchant criticisms of my suggestions, he completely mischaracterizes my approach as "ethical" or as "moral."  So I will try to clarify that.  Also, Dvora has raised some important questions about social construction and the idea of  "facts."  I will address these, too.


I would like to let people know about some of the implications, for interpretive social science, of Michael Polanyi's writings.  For him, the distinctive quality of humans is their rationality.  He defines this to include the whole of human intelligence.  Included in his idea of rationality is the notion of having respect for other people.  All rationality is not equal, but forms gradients, which can be appraised.  (See my past postings, and below.)  Thus, to act rationally entails a striving for rationality.  Higher degrees of rationality are an achievement, like a great dive in the Olympics.

Rational people act for reasons, unless they are crazy.  And rational people shape their behavior so that it shows at least some reasonable degree of respect, or consideration, for others.  Explaining human behavior, as human, then, requires taking its degree of rationality into account.  Appraisal is an i
ntegral part of explanation.  

A berserk postal worker who randomly shoots some of his co-workers is not acting with any degree of rationality – i.e., no reasons and no regard for others.  A psychiatrist would have to look for the a-rational causes of such irrational behavior in order to make sense of it.  But an armed bank robber has reasons for what he is doing.  He may be sane, but he is not displaying a full measure of rationality.  His lack of due regard for the safety of others brings down the degree of rationality in his actions. 

This lack of rationality is a contributing factor towards making his action possible.  Therefore, it is a necessary part of explaining his behavior.  Let's say that both Harry and Larry need money.  Larry says "let's rob a bank.  I've got a gun."  Harry says "no, somebody could get hurt.  Besides, I don't want to risk prison."  Larry says "the risk is minimal; I've seen it done successfully in many movies.  Nobody will get hurt, if they stay out of the way."  So, Larry robs a bank, and Harry spends the day searching Monster for a job.

How do you explain the behavior of Harry and Larry?

First fact:  they are both sane human beings; therefore, they both acted rationally.  However, the degree of rationality with which they acted is not the same.  Secondly, they both felt the desire for money, but each calculated the risk of getting caught differently.  Also, each calculated the=2
0risk of harming others differently.  

Explanation:

For Larry, the desire for money was a primary moving reason, and his lower regard for others was an enabling reason.

For Harry, the desire for money was also a primary moving reason, but his higher degree of rationality inhibited his criminal impulses, and guided him to Monster.  

In this form of explanation, reasons are causes, but it is also necessary to include a discussion of enabling and inhibiting factors.

This form of explanation can be used in all sorts of cases.  Napoleon was ambitious.  He used his power as a military leader to start wars between France and neighboring nations.  George Washington was also ambitious.  But he used his power as a military leader only to free his country.  Both were moved by ambition to exercise military power.  Both caused the deaths of many people.  But were both equally rational?  

The necessary elements for an interpretive social science explanation are: a) identify the relevant facts in a situation under study; b) interpret the moving reasons for the actors, including all enabling and inhibiting factors; and, c) appraise the rationality of the actors.  This is not a neopositivist causal model, such as A caused B.  Nor is this a pretence at obtaining objective knowledge.  Interpretation requires human-to-human empathy.  Only because Larry, Harry, George, and Neo are human, we all can strive to grasp their reasons by relating to them as fellow humans.  We
 study the same facts.  Each makes his or her own interpretations.  Each appraises the rationality of the actors under study.  Then we argue and discuss our reasons with the aim of perhaps reaching a consensus on the explanations for the behavior under study.  

The appraisals we make are not moral judgments, but classifications of human behavior according to its gradient of rationality.  Being himself or herself rational, the social scientist will also give all of his or her reasons for the classification.  Other social scientists can criticize these reasons, and offer their own ranking with their own reasons.   Principles of appraisal can be formulated.  Experts in subject matter areas will develop a body of knowledge that they agree, by consensus, defines their field.  In the process, interpretive social science knowledge can be cumulative. 

Explaining by reference to rationality is more a form of categorization than it is an ethical judgment.  Thus, interpretive social science is science, and not ethical evaluation.  All we do is explain behavior, and rank rationality.  Making ethical evaluations is for another profession.  Journalists, politicians, activist citizens, and others can apply the principles of interpretive social science to criticize the practices of their society.

Practicing physicians, for example, do not do the same thing as medical researchers in their labs.  The docs apply what the research scientist discovers.  This is the distinction between pure rese
arch and the practice of application.  The analysis of gradients of rationality does not entail the practice of rendering ethical judgments.

Furthermore, this form of explanation is NOT CIRCULAR.  It is contextual.  The social scientist defines the context to be studied, makes interpretations, and ranks rationality.  That is not circular.

However, on a much higher level of abstraction, all human knowledge is circular.  Natural science, for example, assumes the world is material.  Everybody does not assume this.  Hindus and other mystics say the material world is an illusion, and only Spirit is real.  Natural scientists, then, assume the world to be material, and "prove" that the world is material with every experiment.  

Every culture defines its own idea of  "factuality."  Polanyi says that the difference is in the degree of plausibility that people will tolerate.  The Azande medicine man will credit the acts of the Great Spirit as the cause of every event, and balk at the very idea of  "natural causes."  Every event in nature that Azandes see, then, they see as proof of the Great Spirit’s power.  In this sense, natural scientist and mystic are engaged in circular reasoning.  But that is not a defect of reasoning, it is the human condition.  

People commit themselves to fundamental principles about the world, and then they interpret their experience in ways that confirm those commitments.  If we did not do this, nothing would make sense, 
and we would all go crazy.  Neopositivist social scientists have their commitments, and we interpretive social scientists have ours.  Because our commitments are more rational than theirs, once the whole social science community is informed about our view, it will become the prevailing view.  Right on!

Bill Kelleher

--------------- 

You can access and download for free

my papers on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) at:

 

http://ssrn.com/author=1053589

 

William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.  
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